FromAnne JOHNSONDateTue, 10 Mar 1998 13:20:19 +0100
ToJoseph Alcamo, Knut H. Alfsen, Dennis Anderson, Zhou Dadi, Gerald R. Davis, Benjamin Dessus, H.J.M. de Vries, Jae Edmonds, (although he cancelled) Joergen Fenhann, Stuart R. Gaffin, Henryk Gaj, Ken Gregory, Arnulf GRUBLER, Erik Haites, William Hare, Mike Hulme, Michael Jefferson, Tae-Yong Jung, Tom Kram, Emilio Lebre La Rovere, Mathew Luhanga, Julio Torres Martinez, Douglas McKay, Laurie Michaelis, Shunsuke Mori, Tsuneyuki Morita, Richard Moss, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, Youssef H. Nassef, William Pepper, Hugh M. Pitcher, Lynn Price, Rich Richels, Holger Rogner, Cynthia Rosenzweig, Priyadarshi Shukla, Jim F. Skea, Leena Srivastava, Rob Swart, Robert Watson, John Weyant, Ernst Worrell
Subjectnew IPCC-SRES Zero Order Draft
Dear Colleagues:

I am sending you a copy of Ged Davis' IPCC-SRES Zero Order Draft on
storylines and scenarios. The text is appended below, but I am also
attaching versions in MS Word and in Rich Text formats so that you can
better view the graphics.

Please send any comments directly to Ged Davis at


Anne Johnson

Zero Order Draft

Storylines and Scenarios

February, 1998

Ged Davis et al

For Comment Only
Draft Paper for the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios


1. Introduction

2. Scenarios - overview

3. Golden Economic Age (A1)

4. Sustainable Development (B1)

5. Divided World (A2)

6. Regional Stewardship (B2)

7. Scenario comparisons

8. Conclusions

Appendix 1: Scenario quantification

1. Introduction

The IS99 scenarios have been constructed to explore future developments in
the global environment with special reference to the production of GHGs.
These scenarios are being developed in three phases:
- Phase 1: the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) team is
preparing a set of scenarios for wide public discussion, which is the
subject of this note,
- Phase 2: the scenarios will be placed on the World Wide Web, subject to
public scrutiny, and suggestions for relevant modification of the scenarios
will be sought,
- Phase 3: the scenarios will be finalised for peer review, incorporating
suggestions received during the public review, by April 1999.
Phase 1 centred on a facilitated open process for Lead Authors at workshops
in Paris, Vienna and Utrecht. The scenarios developed allow for a broad
range of GHG emissions and provide a basis for reflection on policy.

1.1 What are scenarios?
Scenarios are pertinent, plausible, alternative futures. Their pertinence,
in this case, is derived from the need for climate change modelers to have
a basis for assessing the implications of future possible paths for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHGs). Their plausibility is tested by peer
review, in an open process, which includes their publication on the World
Wide Web.

There are clearly an infinite number of possible alternative futures to
explore. We have consciously applied the principle of Occam's Razor ,
seeking the minimum number of scenarios to provide an adequate basis for
climate modelling and challenge to policy makers. The alternative futures
constructed are not, and cannot be, value free since like any work they
self-evidently reflect the team's view of the possible. The scenarios
should not be construed as being desirable or undesirable in their own
right and have been built as descriptions of possible, rather than
preferred, developments. There can be no objective assessment of the
probability of the scenarios, although in the prevailing zeitgeist some
will appear to individuals to be more likely than others. Scenarios are
built to clarify ignorance rather than present knowledge -- the one thing
we can be sure of is that the future will be very different from any of
those we describe!

2. Scenarios - overview

2.1 Scenarios: key questions and dimensions
Developing scenarios for a period of one hundred years is a relatively new
field. Within that period we might expect two major technological
discontinuities, a major shift in societal values and a change in the
balance of geopolitical power. A particular difficulty is that people are
not trained to think in these time-spans, are educated in narrow
disciplines and our ability to model large-systems, at the global level, is
still in its infancy. Additionally, most databases do not go back much
further than 50 years and many less than that. How best to integrate
demography, politico-economic, societal and technological knowledge with
our understanding of ecological systems? Scenarios can be used as an
integration tool, allowing an equal role for intuition, analysis and

Storylines, Scenarios and Scenario Families

Storyline: a narrative description of a scenario (or a family of
scenarios), highlighting the main scenario characteristics, relationships
between key driving forces and the dynamics of the scenarios.

Scenario: projections of a potential future, based on a clear logic and a
quantified storyline.

Scenario family: one or more scenarios which have the same demographic,
politico-societal, economic and technological storyline.

Scenario Classification

Our approach has been to develop a set of four "scenario families". The
storylines of each of these scenario families describes a demographic,
politico-economic, societal and technological future. Within each family
one or more scenarios explore global energy industry and other developments
and their implications for Greenhouse Gas Emissions and other pollutants.
These are a starting point for climate impact modelling.

The scenarios we have built explore two main questions for the 21st
century, neither of which we know the answer to:
- Can adequate governance -- institutions and agreements -- be put in place
to manage global problems?
- Will society's values focus more on enhancing material wealth or be more
broadly balanced, incorporating environmental health and social well-being.
The way we answer these questions leads to four families of scenarios:
- Golden Economic Age (A1): a century of expanded economic prosperity with
the emergence of global governance
- Sustainable Development (B1): in which global agreements and
institutions, underpinned by a value shift, encourages the integration of
ecological and economic goals
- Divided World (A2): difficulty in resolving global issues leads to a
world of autarkic regions
- Regional Stewardship (B2): in the face of weak global governance there is
a focus on managing regional/local ecological and equity

Within these scenario families we examine plausible energy industry and
other developments which will contribute to GHG emissions. Although the
storylines cannot have explicit climate change policy measures in them
there are examples of indirect mitigation measures in some of the scenarios.
The scenario quantifications of the main indicators related to growth of
population and economy, the characteristics of the energy system and the
associated greenhouse gas emissions all fall within the range of prior
studies .

3. Golden Economic Age (A1)

This scenario family entitled "Golden Economic Age", describes rapid and
successful economic development. The primary drivers for economic growth
and development "catch up" are the strong human desire for prosperity, high
human capital (education), innovation, technology diffusion, and free trade.
The logic of successful development assumes smooth growth with no major
political discontinuities or catastrophic events. The scenario family's
development model is based on the most successful historical examples of
economic growth, i.e., on the development path of the now affluent OECD
economies. Historical analogies of successful economic "catching up" can
be found in the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Japan, and South Korea.
"Intangible" assets (human capital, stable political climate) take
precedence over "tangible" assets (capital, resource, and technology
availability) in providing the conditions for a take-off into accelerated
rates of development. Once these conditions are met, free trade enables
each region to access knowledge, technology, and capital to best deploy its
respective comparative economic and human resource advantages.
Institutional frameworks are able to successfully sustain economic growth
and also to handle the inevitable volatility that rapid economic growth

The "intangible" prerequisites for accelerated rates of economic growth
also offer long-term development perspectives for regions that are poorly
endowed with resources or where current economic prospects are not
auspicious, such as Sub-Saharan Africa. There, for instance, fostered
regional trade and capital availability enhance the pull-effects of a
strong South African economy. In other regions, growth may be fuelled by
domestic know-how and high human capital valued at the international
market. An example of this is the thriving software industry of the Indian
subcontinent. In yet other regions, growth could be stimulated by the
expansion of regional economic partnerships and free trade arrangements
(e.g., extensions of NAFTA and the European Union).

The main difference with the historical OECD experience is a certain
acceleration in time and space, (i.e., "leapfrogging") made possible by
better access to knowledge and technology, a consequence of the high-tech
and free trade characteristics of development. Successful catching up
becomes pervasive; all parts of the "developing world" participate, though
with differences in timing. The final outcome is that practically all
parts of the world achieve high levels of affluence by the end of the 21st
century, even if disparities will not have disappeared entirely. The
current distinction between "developed" and "developing" countries will in
any case no longer be appropriate.
As in the past, high growth (a "growing cake") eases distributional
conflicts. Everyone reaps the benefits of rapid growth, rising incomes,
improved access to services, and rising standards of living. The economic
imperatives of markets, free trade, and technology diffusion (i.e.,
competition) that underlie the high growth rates provide for efficient
allocation of resources. Efficiency and high productivity are the positive
by-products of the highly competitive nature of the economy. They also
provide the economic resources for distributive and social measures
required for a stable social and political climate, vital for sustaining
high growth rates in human capital, productivity, innovation, and hence
economic growth.

The economic development focus explains its central metric: the degree of
economic development as reflected in per capita income levels (GDP at
market exchange rates as well as at purchasing power parity rates). The
principal driver is the desire for prosperity, all major driving forces are
closely linked to prosperity levels, with actual causality links going in
both directions. For example, demographic variables co-evolve with
prosperity: mortality declines (i.e. life expectancy increases) as a
function of higher incomes (better diets and affordable medical treatment).
In turn, changes in the social values underlying the fertility transition
also pave the way for greater access to education, modernisation of
economic structures, and market orientation. These are key for innovating
and diffusing the best practice technologies underlying the high
productivity, and hence economic growth, of the scenario.

3.1 Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships

3.11 Population and Economic Development
High education, stable social relations, and incentives for innovation and
experimentation are the preconditions for productivity increases underlying
rapid economic development in this world-- as a result, social, economic,
and demographic development are highly correlated .
The link between demographic and economic variables in the scenario
corresponds to present empirical observations: the affluent live long and
have few children. High per capita incomes are thus associated with both
low mortality and low fertility. Together, this results in rather low
population growth, characterised in addition by a considerable "greying" of
the population.
This family of scenarios combines high life expectancy with low fertility,
where OECD rates are assumed to stabilize at current (below replacement)
levels, and developing countries follow a similar transition by the
mid-21st century. Fertility rates range between 1.3 to 1.7 children per
woman. Life expectancy can approach some 95 years, with a regional
variation between 80 and 95 years. Global population grows to some 9
billion by 2050, and declines to 7 billion by 2100, the result of continued
below replacement fertility in all regions.
Population ageing results in economic growth rates somewhat lower than
historical experience, especially in the OECD countries. Economic growth
rates slow over time in proportion to the reduction of the potentially
economic active population (age 15 to 65), which decline in some regions to
50 percent compared to the historical average of approximately 70 percent.

For "developing countries", economic growth is based on the most successful
cases of economic "catch up" found in history. The economic growth profile
of Japan after WW II served as a model to delineate the upper bounds of
possible GDP growth for all regions. Consistent with growth theory, GDP
expansion initially accelerates, passes through a peak, in which growth
rates around 10 percent per year can be sustained for several decades, and
then declines. Once the economic and industrial base is firmly established
and the economy matures, growth rates decline with increasing income
levels. This reflects saturation effects and a higher emphasis on quality
rather than quantity at high income levels.
The global economy in the "Golden Economic Age" expands at an average
annual rate of three percent per year to 2100. This is about the same rate
as the global average since 1850 and in this respect may simply be
considered "dynamics as usual". Non-Annex-I economies expand with an
average annual growth rate of four percent per year, twice the rate of
Annex-I economies. By approximately 2030 Non-Annex-I GDP surpasses that of
the Annex-I economies. Per capita income disparities are reduced, but
differences between regions are not entirely eliminated. Non-Annex-I per
capita income reaches the 1990 Annex-I level (14,000 $/capita) by around
2040. By 2100 per capita income would approach 100,000 $/capita in Annex-I
countries and 70,000 $/capita in Non-Annex-I countries.

3.12 Equity
Equity issues are not a major concern in the world, but is rather a
by-product of the high rates of economic development. Existing per capita
income gaps between regions close up in a similar way as between Western
Europe and Japan compared to the US in the 20th century. Disparities
continue to persist between regions, but more so within particular regions.
Nevertheless, the high economic growth rates require a certain degree of
income distribution. Extreme income disparities are found to be negative
influencing factors for economic growth. Additionally, fair income
distribution only assures the large consumer markets and the social
cohesion and stability required for the realisation of high economic growth.

3.13 Settlement patterns/communication
Communication technologies and styles are highly homogeneous and extremely
developed -- rather than a "global village" future, this is one of "global
cities." Existing trends towards urbanisation continue, as cities provide
the highest "network externalities" for the educational and R&D-intensive
economic development pattern underlying the scenario. Regional differences
in settlement patterns persist. They range from fragmented, compact, but
large (i.e., 20+ million inhabitants) cities that depopulate their
respective rural hinterlands in Latin America to urban "corridors"
connected by high capacity communication and transport networks (in Asia).
Regional transport networks include high speed trains and maglevs, which
ultimately fuse short- and long-distance transport means into single
interconnected infrastructures. In some parts of the world high-tech cars
take the place that high-tech trains occupy in other parts.
The large urban agglomerates and the high transport demands of a high
material growth economy generate vast congestion constraints. These are
solved by applying market-based instruments (prices) rather than
regulation. Economic instruments include access and parking fees,
auctioning off the limited number of new car and truck licenses in
megacities, much along the lines of the current stringent Singapore model.
Therefore, even at very high income levels, car ownership rates could be
comparatively low in parts of the world. In extremely densely populated
areas, cars remain a luxury rather than a means of mass transport (viz.
Hong Kong). In areas with lower population density, car densities are high
(+1 car per inhabitant). Car fuels could be either oil, synfuels,
electricity, or hydrogen. Intercontinental transport is provided by
energy- and GHG-intensive hypersonic aircraft fuelled by methane or
hydrogen. They are the physical transport equivalent of the high capacity
virtual communication links of a truly global economy.

3.14 Environmental Concerns/Ecological resilience
Ecological resilience is assumed to be high. In and of themselves,
ecological concerns receive a low priority. Instead, the valuation of
environmental amenities is strictly in economic terms, e.g., a function of
affluence. Non-congestion, clean water and air, and recreational
possibilities in nature all assume increasing importance with rising
affluence, although preferences for environmental amenities may differ
across regions and income levels. For instance, urban air quality and
human health are valued highly even at income levels lower than those
prevailing in England, where stringent air quality measures were introduced
after the "killer smog" of 1952. Reduced particulate and sulphur air
pollution become a matter of major consumer preference at levels of $2,000
- 3,000/capita income in Asia. Altogether, the concept of environmental
quality changes from "conservation" of nature to active "management" --and
marketing-- of natural and environmental amenities and services.

3.2 Scenarios
The core bifurcation (with respect to GHG emissions) of the scenario family
unfolds around alternative paths of technology development in the
agriculture and energy sectors. In the energy sector, the central question
is how to manage the transition away from the current reliance on
conventional oil and gas. In the agricultural sector, the key issue
concerns land productivity.
Alternative technology bifurcations lead to a number of scenarios embedded
and consistent within the overall theme of "prosperity via high
techologies". All scenarios provide the high quantities of clean and
convenient energy forms and diverse, high quality food demanded in an
affluent world. Because technological change is cumulative, it can go in
alternative, mutually exclusive directions, i.e., changes become "path
dependent". Alternative directions unfold around the interrelated cluster
of variables of resource availability and conversion technologies in both
energy and agriculture. For instance, new technologies may enable humanity
to tap either the vast quantities of fossil resources existing in the form
of coal, unconventional oil, and gas with technologies that are both highly
economic, efficient, and clean in terms of traditional pollutants, such as
particulates or sulphur. Alternatively, technological change could unfold
favouring non-fossil technologies and resources, such as nuclear and
A similar bifurcation unfolds in the agricultural sector. In one
sub-scenario, only incremental improvements are achieved in farming
practices and land productivity. This is combined with a gradual global
diffusion of meat-based diets. Both of these trends are land- (and
deforestation-) intensive. Alternatively, global agriculture could move in
the direction of genetically engineered, high productivity crops and
"sea-farming," combined with a quality- and health-oriented diet based on
fish and vegetables, both of which are relatively less land intensive. As
a result, GHG emissions range widely even for otherwise similar scenario

3.21 Energy Resources/Technology
Resource availability and technology are tightly interrelated. The "Golden
Economic Age" of high productivity growth results from substantial
technological innovation. Both contribute to economic growth, expansion of
accessible resources, and improved efficiency in resource use. Factor
productivity improvements occur across the board for agricultural land,
materials, and energy. Improvement rates largely follow long-term
historical trends and are entirely technology- and income- driven. Energy
intensity (total commercial and traditional primary energy use per unit of
GDP) improves at an aggregate global rate of 1.5 percent per year.
Improvement rates vary across regions as a function of distance from the
productivity frontier and the turnover rates of capital stock. Ceteris
paribus, improvement rates are higher in regions with currently lower
efficiency and greater than average GDP growth. This assumes no particular
policy intervention or additional price regulation apart from the ones
consistent with a free market environment (i.e. price subsidies are
removed, and full costing principles are established).

Per capita final energy use gradually converges as income gaps close.
Final energy use per capita in non-Annex-I countries would reach
approximately 85 GJ (2 tons of oil equivalent) by 2050 and approximately
125 GJ (3 toe) by 2100, i.e., about the current average of OECD countries
outside North America. Despite improvements in productivity and
efficiency, the high income levels lead to resource use close to the upper
bounds of the scenarios available in the literature. For instance, global
final energy use would increase to approximately 1000 EJ by 2100.

The scenarios developed are a function of the different directions taken by
technological change. The key question is which primary resources may
become economically accessible in the future, and which technologies will
become available to convert these primary resources into the final goods
and services demanded by consumers. In the energy area,
resources/technologies are key variables in determining the timing and
nature of the transition away from currently dominant conventional oil and
Four pathways are possible:
1. Progress across all resources and technologies.
2. "Clean coal" technologies: environmentally friendly except for GHG
emissions and possible resource extraction impacts.
3. "Oil/Gas": smooth transition from conventional to unconventional oil and
gas, tapping the vast occurrences of unconventional fossil fuels, including
methane clathrates.
4. "Bio-Nuclear": rapid technological progress in non-fossil supply and
end-use technologies, e.g. renewables, such as solar and biomass
combustion, nuclear and hydrogen-fuelled end-use devices, such as fuel cells.

For the scenario quantification, a number of contrasting cases,
characterised by the main energy form used in the second half of the 21st
century, have been evaluated with the aid of formal energy models:
1. The dominance of Non-Fossil fuels -- the "Bio-Nuclear" scenario (A1R).
2. The dominance of unconventional gas, including hydrates, and oil (A1G)
3. The dominance of "Clean Coal" (A1C)

A brief scenario taxonomy is given below.

Oil/Gas Resource
Technology Improvements
Fuel Availability Coal Oil/Gas Non-fossil
A1R Non-fossil Medium (<50 ZJ ) Low Medium High
A1G Oil/Gas High (>75 ZJ) Low High Low
A1C Coal Low (<35 ZJ) High Low Low
Depending on the assumed availability of oil and gas, (low/medium/high) and
corresponding improvements in production and conversion technologies for
coal, oil/gas, and non-fossil technologies, different energy systems
structures unfold. For instance, in the dynamic technology cases, liquid
fuels from coal or unconventional oil/gas resources would become available
at less than $30 /barrel, with costs falling further by about one percent
per year with exploitation of learning curve effects. Non-fossil
electricity (photovoltaics, new nuclear) would become available at costs of
less than 10 mills/kWh ($.01/kWh) and continue to improve further as a
result of learning curve effects. The basic premise of the "dynamic
technology" scenarios is that energy services could be delivered at
long-run costs not higher than today, but with technologies having
radically different characteristics, including environmental. In the event
that such technology dynamics do not materialise, energy costs and prices
would be significantly higher than suggested above -- illustrative model
runs suggest energy demand would be up to 20 percent lower for a fossil
scenario without significant cost improvements .

3.22 Agriculture
In the agricultural sector, two contrasting scenarios of land productivity
could unfold, depending on the nature of advances in agricultural
technologies. However, CO2 emissions from land use changes could range
from 0.5 (low) to 1.5 (high) GtC by 2030 and from -1 to -2 (low) to zero
(high) GtC emissions by 2100. In the latter case tropical forests
essentially become depleted as a result of land-use conversions for
agriculture and biomass fuel plantations. In the former case, land
productivity gains are so substantial that ploughing of marginal
agricultural land is no longer economically feasible and is abandoned,
following recent trends in the OECD. The resulting expansion of forest
cover leads to a net sequestration of atmospheric CO2.

3.23 Scenario Quantification
An initial scenario quantification in terms of population, GDP, energy use,
and CO2 emissions for the three energy resource/technology sub-scenarios is
summarised in Appendix 1 . The global scenario for 2100 is also summarised
in the form of a snowflake diagram. All scenario quantifications are
tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for A1 scenarios]

3.24 CO2 Emissions
The diverging pathways of resource availability and technological change
characteristic of the three scenarios examined result in a wide range of
annual CO2 emissions: from 10 to 33 GtC by 2100. It is interesting to note
that the emissions of the two "fossil fuel" sub-scenarios, "clean coal" and
"oil and gas," are quite close to each other (33 CtC versus 29 GtC).
Continued reliance on oil and gas, coupled with demand growth, explain the
emission patterns for the oil/gas scenario. Coal is the only fossil
resource available in the "clean coal" scenario. Therefore, over time coal
is increasingly required for conversion into premium fuels such as
synliquids and syngas. This conversion "deepening" leads to a feedstock
premium for coal and increases the market potential of non-fossil fuels.
CO2 emissions are therefore not as high as in traditional coal-intensive
4. Sustainable Development (B1)

The central elements of this scenario family include high levels of
environmental and social consciousness, successful governance including
major social innovation, and reductions in income and social inequality.
Successful forms of governance allow many problems which are currently hard
or difficult to resolve to fall within the competency of government and
other organisations. Solutions reflect a wide stakeholder dialogue leading
to consent on international environmental and social agreements. This is
coupled with bottom-up solutions to problems, which reflect wide success in
getting broad-based support within communities.
The concerns over global sustainable development, expressed in a myriad of
environmental and social issues, results in the eventual successful
management of the interaction between human activities and the biosphere.
While no explicit climate policy is undertaken, other kinds of initiatives
lead to lower energy use, and clean energy systems, which significantly
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Besides cleaning up air quality, there is
emphasis on improving the availability and quality of water.

4.1 Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships

4.11 Technological Development
High levels of technological development focused on achieving sustainable
development leads to high levels of material and energy saving, innovations
in emissions control technology, as well as labour productivity. The
latter is essential to support the rapid growth in personal income, given
that a major increase in labour force participation is implicit in the
equity assumptions. Technologies tend to be implemented in an industrial
ecology mode, implying a much more highly integrated form of industrial
production than at present. Information technology achieves a global
spread, and is fully integrated into production technologies. Advances in
international institutions permit the rapid diffusion of new technologies
-- R&D approaches two percent of GDP.

4.12 Population and Economic Development
Population -- reaches only 9 billion by 2100 -- due to a faster than
expected completion of the demographic transition arising from a large
increase of women in the labour force, universal literacy, and concern for
the environmental impacts of high population levels. The potential impacts
of ageing populations which emerge from this low level of population growth
are offset by relatively high levels of immigration, which reduce the
negative impacts of ageing populations on savings and the ability of
societies to adapt and implement new and cleaner technologies.
This world has a faster than expected transition from traditional to modern
economic sectors throughout the developing world. In addition, widespread
education leads to high labour productivity, and high labour force
participation. Migration serves to sustain the size of the labour force in
developed countries, which helps to maintain their growth in per capita
income. Developing countries experience few institutional failures,
enabling them to grow at or near the historical upper bounds of experience
given their per capita incomes.
This yields a world of high levels of economic activity, with significant
and deliberate progress being made with respect to international and
national inequality of income. The current order of magnitude differences
in income between developing and developed countries are reduced to a
factor of two, with moderate growth continuing to occur in OECD countries.
Gross World Product (GWP) reaches $350 trillion by 2100 and average global
incomes $40,000 per capita. Economic development is balanced and, given
the high environmental consciousness and institutional effectiveness, this
leads to a better quality environment, with many of the aspects of rapid
growth being anticipated and dealt with effectively. Active management of
income distribution is undertaken through use of taxes and subsidies. The
composition of final demand will evolve to a mix reflecting lower use of
materials and energy, thus easing the impact of high income levels.

4.13 Equity
In this world there is a preparedness to address issues of social and
political equity. The increases in equity, reflect a shift in values
which, with widespread education, leads to greater opportunity for all.
New social inventions, such as the Grameen Bank's micro-credit schemes, are
a significant contributor to an increase in institutional effectiveness and
equity improvement.

4.14 Communications, Settlement Patterns and Environment
The social innovations and effective governance rest on high levels of
communication, both in a passive (i.e. TV) and active sense. Governance
systems reflect high levels of consent from those affected by decisions,
and this consent arises out of active participation in the governance process.
Settlement patterns arise from design, and tend to reflect a distributed,
compact, city design structure. This results in high amenity levels, and
the careful design and location of these cities results in a lessening of
the natural disasters which plague many cities today. Advanced hazard
warning systems and careful design limit the impact of such disasters.
Low emission technologies, and careful management of land use, preservation
of large tracts of land, and active intervention to counteract the impacts
of imprudent societal actions strengthen the resilience of the ecological

4.2 Scenarios

4.21 Energy Resources/Technology
Energy efficiency innovations, and successful institutional innovations
disseminating their use, result in much lower levels of energy use relative
to historic patterns. The forward-looking nature of societal planning
results in relatively smooth transitions to alternative energy systems as
conventional oil and gas resources dwindle in availability. There is major
use of unconventional natural gas as fuel supply during the transition, but
the major push is towards renewable resources such as solar and wind. The
impact of environmental concerns is a significant factor in the planning
for new energy systems.
Two alternative energy systems, leading to two sub-scenarios, are
considered to provide this energy:
1. Widespread expansion of natural gas, with a growing role for renewable
energy (scenario B1N). Oil and coal are of lesser importance, especially
post-2050. This transition is faster in the developed than in the
developing countries.
2. A more rapid development of renewables, replacing coal and oil; the bulk
of the remaining energy coming from natural gas (scenario B1R).

4.22 Scenario Quantification
Per capita incomes in the developed world are close to ___ in 2100, while
average per capita income in the developing world grows from ___ % of the
developed world in 1990 to ____ % in 2100. Energy per unit of output
continues to fall at about historical rates in the developed countries,
resulting in total energy use of ____ EJ in 2100. Rapid spread of
technology from developed to developing countries enables an energy growth
of ___ percent less than GDP, resulting in total energy use of ___ EJ in
the developing part of the world
An initial quantification of the scenarios in terms of population, GDP,
energy use, and CO2 emissions for the two energy resource/technology
scenarios is summarised in Appendix 1. The global scenario for 2100 is
also summarised in the form of a snowflake diagram. All scenario
quantifications are tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for B1 scenarios]

4.23 CO2 Emissions
The range of carbon in CO2 emissions for the scenarios is 7.5 to 20 billion
tons in 2100, reflecting 3 and 2 percent per year reductions in carbon per
unit of GDP

5. Divided World (A2)

In a retreat from the globalising trends of the previous century, the world
"consolidates" into a series of roughly continental economic regions.
Regions pursue different economic strategies based on the resources and
options available to them. Trade within economic regions increases, while
trade between regions is controlled by tariff and non-tariff barriers to
support the region's economic strategy. High income regions restrict
immigration and impose selective controls on technology transfer to
maintain high incomes for their residents.
High income regions encourage higher levels of education to increase the
productivity of their labour force. They impose restrictions on immigrants,
except skilled immigrants, to keep per capita incomes high. They also try
to impose selective restrictions on technology transfer to maintain the
productivity of their labour force.
Low income regions are only able to increase per capita incomes slowly.
They do not have the resources to invest in educating the labour force or
in research and development. Investment from other regions is constrained.
Thus exports are primarily products manufactured with low cost labour and
some natural resource-intensive products. Population growth is high
relative to high income regions. Income inequality becomes more pronounced
within low income regions and increases between regions.

Regions use non-tariff barriers, such as differences in standards and
labelling requirements, to limit trade. Trade is also dampened by
differences in tastes in products. These factors favour the use of
resources found within each region. Regions that have abundant coal
resources but very limited oil resources, for example, encourage use of
"local" coal by heavy industries and electric utilities while allowing
restricting free imports of crude oil and petroleum products .

5.1 Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships

5.11 Population and Economic Development
Fertility rates vary among regions. North America, Northwest Europe and
Asia experience falling fertility rates and populations. The Middle East,
Africa, and to some extent, Southern Europe and South America see rising
population although the rate of growth decreases. This leads to a shift in
the world population balance from the Indian sub-continent and South East
Asia to the Middle East and Africa by the end of the century. World
population reaches 16 billion by 2100.
Regional economies emphasise self-sufficiency with wide variations in
growth levels. Average global economic growth is relatively low at around
2.5%/year, leading to a GWP of $250 trillion by 2100. Trade across regions
consists primarily of raw materials and semi-finished goods in a relatively
low trust world where dependence on other regions is minimised.

5.12 Government and Geopolitics
National boundaries become less important within the regions as an
increasing share of policy is agreed at the regional level. This allows
considerable cultural diversity within regions. Governmental style is also
diverse across regions. In some, government and religion strengthen their
links, in others, secular democracy is maintained or consolidated.
Education is strengthened in most regions with a deepening understanding of
cultural history and religion. The growing strength of the economic
regions, and their competing economic interests, lead to reduced
international co-operation. Global environmental, economic and social
issues are subject to relatively weak governance. Conflicts between ethnic
and religious groups within economic regions become less violent as a
result of economic pressures on the parties. Where ethnic and religious
violence persists, the groups are excluded from the economic region. Thus
wars occur in the boundary zones between economic regions. Wars may also
occur near regional boundaries for control of scarce natural resources.

5.13 Technology Developments
While underlying science is conducted in all regions an information about
scientific developments are available world-wide, consumption and
production patterns and hence, technology and practices, are determined by
local circumstances.

Research activity increases in all regions; in high income regions due to
the need to increase productivity with limited regional resources and in
low income regions due to the growing size of the population. Restrictions
on transfer of some technologies to other regions is widespread.

High income regions invest heavily in education to enhance labour
productivity. Some high-income regions move towards broad-based education
for a knowledge-based society. Others move towards practical education
(lots of science and engineering) for an advanced industrial society. Low
income regions are not able to invest as heavily in education, but the
levels (and future rates of economic growth, vary significantly.

Technological change is rapid in some regions, slow in others, with
industry adjusting to local resource endowments, cultural characteristics
and education levels.

5.14 Communication and Settlement Patterns
Languages become more uniform within regions, but globally more diverse.
Speakers of the main world languages are fairly evenly split. Computerised
translation eliminates the language barrier to technology diffusion and
economic development.
Urban concentration continues except in Europe and North America, which
move towards larger numbers of smaller cities and towns. Urban shares of
population in other countries rise to current OECD levels by 2020. While
there is free movement within most regions, there is very little migration
among regions. Refugee problems are confined to edge areas, for example,
Baltics and Tibet.

5.15 Environmental Concerns
Environmental management follow pragmatic paths: with rising incomes,
people become increasingly concerned first about urban pollution, then
about regional pollution, finally about global problems. In this world,
global environmental problems are discussed extensively but the will to
tackle them is lacking. Propensity to worry about the environment is
regionally variable. Sulphur emissions are rapidly reduced in South and
South East Asia due to the impacts on agriculture but increase in Africa
with exploitation of coal and minerals there.

5.2 Scenarios
Divided World is explored through a single scenario.
5.21 Resource Availability
Regions try to use their resource endowment for their economic advantage.
Regions with abundant energy and mineral resources use those resources
domestically and to produce exports (surplus to expected long-term needs).
Regions poor in energy and mineral resources will minimise their dependence
on these resources. High-income, resource-poor regions will develop as
service-based, dematerialised economies, while low-income, resource-poor
regions are forced to limit their consumption of resources.

High-income regions without indigenous oil and gas undergo a near-complete
conversion to an energy economy based on nuclear or renewable based
electricity and synthetic gases and liquids by 2050. India and China adopt
these technologies at the largely exhausting domestic coal reserves by
2050. Renewable input, zero waste industry is pioneered in South East Asia
and adopted in Europe, minimising mineral and fossil fuel requirements by
2050. Oil and gas-rich regions (North Africa, the Middle East, Central
Asia, Russia) continue to use fossil fuels but towards 2050 the falling
cost of renewable technology (wind and biomass in Russia, photovoltaic in
the other regions) begins to make them competitive even in these regions

5.22 Scenario Quantification
An initial quantification of the scenario in terms of population, GDP,
energy use, and CO2 emissions is summarised in Appendix 1. The global
scenario for 2100 is also summarised in the form of a snowflake diagram.
All scenario quantifications are tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for A2 scenarios]

5.23 CO2 Emissions
The level of carbon in CO2 emissions for the scenario is 15 billion tons in
2100 as only oil and gas rich regions continue to use fossil fuels.

6. Regional Stewardship (B2)

"Regional Stewardship" is based on a natural evolution of the present
institutional policies and structures. As such it does not incorporate
major geopolitical power shifts or fundamental technological
discontinuities. There is relatively low trust, global agreements are
difficult to reach and the result is 'multiple islands' with inward looking
This is a world of good intentions, which are not capable of being
implemented. The late 20th century value shift towards environmental
stewardship continues, for example as envisioned in the Cairo and Rio
Programs of Action, with increasing recognition of the importance of human
welfare and inequity. These concerns cannot be tackled at a global level
and are resolved regionally or locally. Environmental solutions are
tempered by the desire for balance with economic goals in many areas - but
poor governance means that meeting the needs of the poor and future
generations is hampered by limited prosperity.
Families think seriously about the fact that their offspring may be dealing
with a more ecologically stressed world, moreover one with limited
financial resources for dealing with such problems. Education levels are
high so that the ability of families to internalise global concerns in
their family planning decisions is also high. The relative stabilisation
of world population growth after 2050 leads to general optimism about the
ability of society to solve problems such as food and water supply.

6.1 Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships

6.11 Population
Both local governance and environmental concerns limit population growth.
The world largely supports efforts to reduce unwanted births both as a
social service but also because there is an implicit belief that even
increasing populations have severe environmental consequences. Education
and welfare programs for the young and illiterate are widely pursued.

Population stabilises at 10.5 billion people by 2100. Since economic
growth is relatively slow, fertility rates do not decline strongly. But,
the effect of fertility rate declines on lowering population size outweigh
those of mortality rate decreases increasing population size.

The stabilisation of global population (largely after 2050) leads to a new
atmosphere for social planning. It becomes considerably easier than at
present for education, health care and pension programs. Age cohort sizes
are much more stable through time than at present, although of course,
overall ageing continues.

6.12 Economic Development
GWP grows to around 240 trillion $ in 2100 with a North/South income ratio
of approximately 7/1 (presently 13/1). Concerns about the ecological costs
of consumerist lifestyles receive wide attention and attempts are made,
first in industrial countries, but later in developing countries, to seek
satisfaction through community activities rather than high consumption.
Overall people are eager to find alternatives to the high income world of

6.13 Governance
Governance is weak globally but strong nationally and regionally.
Deliberate policies to limit trade for environmental and social reasons
hinder the transfer of technologies. However pollution trading concepts
catch on as a way of driving down the costs of pollution control.
International alliances occur based on particular national circumstances,
such as in the development of biomass technologies. This fragmentation
gives rise to pockets of environmental and social justice activists.
Environmental policies vary widely across regions, for example in
acceptable sulphur emission levels. NGO and public interest groups are
strong, influential and busy.

6.14 Equity
While strong redistribution policies are enacted within regions to reduce
income disparity, income differences between regions persist globally
throughout the century and even increases in absolute terms, although the
relative inequity decreases. The mechanism by which global equity
increases relates in part to population dynamics: as fertility rates
decline in developing countries, the decrease in youth dependency ratios
leads to an increase in savings rate and strengthened economic growth
during the first half of the century. In the developed regions, by
contrast, ageing becomes an increasing drag on economic growth in helping
to converge global incomes, concerns about the persistence of income
inequality world-wide are swamped by the local concerns and conscious
policies to limit international trade.

6.15 Settlement Patterns
A strong deurbanization trend occurs in this world because of increasing
concern about the marginalization of the very poor that accompanies massive
urbanisation. There are also concerns about managing large transient
populations that migrate seasonally to cities for short term employment,
for example in the construction industry.

Immigration is controlled but accepted, partly to compensate for very low
fertility rates in some regions and partly to help economic development
worldwide without the problems of uncontrolled globalisation.

6.16 Environmental Policy
Environmental improvement is strongly pursued although regional policies
vary widely such as with sulphur controls. Marked reductions in S, CH4,
deforestation, CFCs and N2O occur and water quality is addressed.
Ecological resilience is not seen as high. The environment is viewed as
quite fragile and requiring careful policy stewardship. Resource
extraction is viewed as intrinsically problematic and scepticism persists
regarding the ability of society to prevent environmental disasters like
the Valdez oil spill and Kuwaiti oil fires. Indeed the world is
increasingly sensitive about and intolerant of such events and much tension
exists concerning this aspect of development. Environment groups lobby
hard on these themes and paint a picture of rapidly depleting natural

6.2 Scenarios

6.21 Energy Resources/Technology
Because of the concern about ecological fragility, alternative and
renewable energy systems are viewed with much hope and are socially and
politically encouraged. Biomass technologies and policies are invigorated.
The labour and land intensive developing countries pursue biomass
production while the capital intensive developed regions develop the
required technologies. A degree of co-operation coalesces about such
mutually symbiotic activities.
Consumers accept a rather long return in evaluating energy-efficiency
investments. Mass transit systems are very successful and profitable.
Advances in transportation technology are rapid.

Hydroelectric power is a constrained bag. Dams are viewed with disdain
because there are soon no more wild rivers anywhere and the rights of
indigenous people have been egregiously violated. Although they are
relatively clean from the perspective of carbon emissions, their effects on
indigenous people (mercury poisoning of fish, etc.) becomes unacceptable.
Decommissioning dams is widespread to restore pristine ecological systems

Reduction in carbon intensity is not viewed as a policy goal but it
declines for other reasons. It is a frugal world with limited resource
availability and so the paradigm grows that it is less costly to save
energy than it is to buy it and use it. This spurs the development of
technologies that use carbon more efficiently. In addition the
accompanying emissions of NOx and SOx and tropospheric ozone are
increasingly viewed as unacceptable.

6.23 Scenario Quantification
An initial scenario quantification in terms of population, GDP, energy use,
and CO2 emissions for the scenario is summarised in Appendix 1.
Energy intensity declines at a rate of 1.3%/year to a value of 0.12
toe/$1000 in 2100. This represents a total global energy usage in 2100 of
1250 EJ, of which 300 EJ is oil and gas; 100 EJ coal and 900 EJ is
non-carbon renewables, with nuclear's role limited.

The global scenario for 2100 is also summarised in the form of a snowflake
diagram. All scenario quantifications are tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for B2 scenario]

6.24 CO2 Emissions
By 2100 CO2 emissions 11.5 GtC/year, of which 5 GtC/year is emitted by the
North and 6.5 GtC/year by the South. Carbon intensity declines at a rate
of 0.8%/year to 2100, to a value of 0.3 tC/toe, some 50% of today's value.
7. Scenario Comparisons
[To be written]

8. Conclusions
[To be written]

Appendix 1: Scenario Quantification
[To be written]

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